We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.
Introduction
A similar mathematical structure, comparative statics of the solution of a system of equations, underlies diverse economic results such as the efficiency of the English auction and the Stolper-✩ The results in this paper were circulated earlier as two separate papers: "Minimal Assumptions for Efficiency in Asymmetric English auctions," by Dubra, and "Comparative Statics, English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem," by Echenique and Manelli. We thank Rabah Amir, Sergei Izmalkov, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Peter Neary, John Quah, Kevin Reffett, and Chris Shannon for useful comments. Manelli's research was partially supported by NSF grants SES-0095524 and SES-0241373.
Samuelson theorem. We find that related assumptions on the system of equations allow us to extend, significantly, the domain of application of both results. We prove that the English auction has an efficient ex post equilibrium in environments where this result had not been previously obtained. We also prove versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for economies with more than two goods and factors, and for non-square economies.
Consider the system of equations 
. , p n )?
To provide a meaningful answer to this classic question, restrictions must be imposed on the functions v 1 , . . . , v n . Our assumptions have the flavor of a "relative sensitivity" requirement. Suppose each function v i is relatively more sensitive to one variable (which we will call "its own" variable) than to the others. If the effect of such variable s i on v i is an "own" effect, we might require that the own effect be relatively more important than the "cross" effect, the effect of s i on v j . Suppose for instance that n = 2 and that v 1 (s 1 , s 2 ) and v 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) are increasing functions. Let parameters change so that p 1 > p 1 and p 2 < p 2 . Since v 1 and v 2 are increasing, s 1 and s 2 cannot both increase or decrease simultaneously. Our "relative sensitivity" implies, as a consequence, that s 1 > s 1 and s 2 < s 2 . We warn the reader that our formal assumption varies with the application considered, and that it differs from the discursive version in this paragraph. Still, the intuitive rendition illustrates its use.
We now describe how a similar formal structure underlies both applications, the efficiency of the English auction and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. For expositional ease, we begin with the latter.
Consider an economy with two goods, two factors of production, and constant-returns-toscale technologies. Let v i (s 1 , s 2 ), i = 1, 2, be the per-unit cost of producing good i given factor prices (s 1 , s 2 ). If output prices (p 1 , p 2 ) are exogenously determined-the standard small-country assumption in international trade-an equilibrium in the factors' markets is the solution to
The interpretation of (2) is that there are no extraordinary profits in the production of goods 1 and 2-a consequence of the combined assumptions, standard in international trade theory, that both goods are produced in equilibrium and that the technologies are constant returns to scale. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that if the production of good 1 is relatively more intense in the use of factor 1, an exogenous increase in the price of good 1 brings about an increase in the price of factor 1 and a decrease in the price of factor 2. Let K and L represent factors 1 and 2 respectively, and let K i (s 1 , s 2 ) and L i (s 1 , s 2 ) be the cost-minimizing quantities of factors in sector i when factor prices are (s 1 , s 2 ). Stolper and Samuelson's factor-intensity assumption is that
Using Shepard's lemma, however, the factor-intensity assumption can be stated as ∂v 1 2 ). It is this formulation in terms of average cost functions that facilitates our approach. Stolper and Samuelson's factor-intensity condition is an instance of our "relative sensitivity" property. Expressed as an inequality of factor ratios, the factor-intensity condition does not readily generalize to economies with more than two goods and two factors. We will make our "relative sensitivity" assumption on the average cost curves, and this allows us to extend the notion of factor-intensity to economies with more than two factors, and to non-square economies.
In turn, this leads to new versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We turn to our auctions application. Consider an English auction where two (ex ante) different bidders have interdependent valuations. Bidder i, i = 1, 2, only observes her private signal s i before the auction, and i's valuation for the object is v i (s 1 , s 2 ). If p is the price quoted by the auctioneer, a solution (s 1 (p), s 2 (p)) to the system
indicates that both bidders are indifferent between getting the object and abandoning the auction.
). This inverse function can be used to construct bidding strategies: bidder i with signal s i will remain in the auction until the auctioneer arrives at price p i (s i ). Under certain "relative sensitivity" assumptions on the value functions, it can be shown that these bidding strategies implement an efficient ex post equilibrium in the English auction. The question of whether English auctions have efficient ex post equilibria in the environments described, was first posed by Maskin [10] . He studied the two-bidder case and assumed a "single crossing condition," namely that
This condition captures the notion that s i is more important for v i than for v j , j = i and it therefore belongs to the "relative sensitivity" family of assumptions. Maskin proved that his condition implies that a solution (s 1 (p), s 2 (p)) to (4) exists, that it is unique and increasing, and that the implicit bidding strategies implement an efficient ex post equilibrium. Maskin's result, however, does not extend to auctions with more than two bidders. Krishna [9] describes a three-bidder example, satisfying Maskin's single-crossing property (applied pairwise), where the English auction does not have an efficient equilibrium. 1 Our "relative sensitivity" allows us to prove the existence of ex post efficient equilibria with arbitrarily many bidders.
The reader will have noticed that Stolper and Samuelson's factor-intensity condition and Maskin's single crossing property are very similar.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
We prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The first one applies to square economies with n goods and factors of production; the second applies to non-square economies.
Consider a standard international-trade model. There are n non-traded, non-produced factors used in the production of n traded, final goods. Factor endowments are owned by consumers who offer them inelastically. Inputs are not consumed. A small-country assumption implies that the prices p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) of the n consumption goods are exogenously given. The endogenous vector of factor prices is denoted by s = (s 1 , s 2 2 Stolper and Samuelson [14] further assume that there are only two goods and two factors, that the per-unit cost functions v i are differentiable, and that the production of good 1 is relatively more intense in the use of factor 1 as discussed in the Introduction. The thesis of their theorem is that an exogenous increase in the price of good 1 brings about an increase in the price of factor 1 and a decrease in the price of factor 2.
Of their extra assumptions, we only need the "relative sensitivity" assumption, a notion of factor-intensity that can be applied to more general economies than those studied by Stolper and Samuelson.
Let
The set P (s − s) identifies the coordinates that have increased, the strictly positive coordinates of (s − s). 
The dominant-effect property is a relative-factor-intensity assumption. In the two-factor-twogood case, it states that if the price of factor 1 increases and the price of factor 2 decreases, then the cost of good 1 must increase more than the cost of good 2 (or the cost of good 2 must decrease more than the cost of good 1). That is to say, the production of every good i must be relatively more intense in the use of the factor i. Indeed, with differentiable cost functions and n = 2, the Stolper-Samuelson factor-intensity assumption 3 implies the dominant-effect property.
The dominant-effect property generalizes the notion of relative factor-intensity to economies with more than two goods and with non-differentiable cost functions. Suppose several factor prices change simultaneously. The dominant-effect property requires that one of the goods whose "corresponding factor-price" has increased must have a larger cost-increase than the cost-increase of any good whose "corresponding factor-price" decreased. In the two-factor-two-good case, Theorem 1 states that if a country opens up to trade and as a consequence p 1 increases while p 2 either decreases or stays the same, then the price of factor 1 will increase and the price of factor 2 will decrease. Thus the owners of factor 1 will gain and the owners of factor 2 will lose from opening up to trade.
In the n-factor-n-good case, Theorem 1 states that, if p 1 increases, and p h either decreases or stays the same, for all other goods h, then the owners of factor 1 will gain, and the owners of at least one of the other factors will lose. Note that the thesis of Theorem 1 is weaker in this case because it does not say that s h < s h for all h = i. 4 Theorem 1 delivers the message of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in considerable generality. It is global because, unlike the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, it applies to any changes in prices, not only infinitesimal changes. In summary, the differences between Theorem 1 and Stolper and Samuelson's statement are as follows.
(1) Stolper and Samuelson's relative factor-intensity condition for two goods is stronger than the dominant-effect property. The original Stolper-Samuelson theorem, and its generalization in Theorem 1, share the assumption that the number of final goods is the same as the number of factors. This is probably unrealistic. We offer a generalization of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that avoids this assumption. The generalization is obtained by simply varying the dimensionality of the variables s i and p j from scalars to vectors. Then, the same framework used in Theorem 1 yields the desired extension. 
We have thus redefined system (1) so that all variables are vectors. If we set k i = 1 = m i for all i = 1, . . . , n, we are back in the framework of Theorem 1, an n-sector economy with n final goods and n factors. If in addition n = 2, we have the classic Stolper-Samuelson environment.
We now adapt the dominant-effect property to the new environment, and to do so, we must look at the set P (s − s) that figures conspicuously in its definition. Given s , s, and an order , let
In our previous applications when s i was a scalar, the order was the standard order on the real line; the meaning of s i s i is simply s i > s i . In the new environment s i is a k i -dimensional vector and therefore we have options in defining s i s i . We choose the following order We will briefly comment on alternative definitions of after we state the theorem.
We are now ready to state the adapted dominant-effect property. The functions v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n satisfy the adapted dominant-effect property if for any s and s with P (s − s) = ∅,
where v j (s) is the th component of the m j -dimensional vector v j (s). The adapted dominant-effect property is simply an expression of the factor-intensity assumption, as discussed for square economies.
As before, we say that a pair of prices (s, p) is an equilibrium if The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and therefore we omit it. Alternative definitions of the order used, give rise to variations of the dominant-effect property and of the theorem above. For instance, if we strengthen the adapted dominant-effect property so that s i s i if and only if s i s i , the theorem then concludes that s i > s i for all , = 1, . . . , k i : the prices of all factors (in which sector i is intensive) increase.
We conclude the section with a discussion of related literature. There is a large literature on generalizations of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We refer the interested reader to Ethier [5] for a survey. The closest result to Theorem 1 is an application of the weak axiom of cost minimization (Ethier [5] ). This application, however, barely retains the economic content of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem because it does not say which factor-prices change as a result of specific changes in goods prices. 5 In trade theory, predicting who will win (and thus favor) an opening to trade, is important. Contrary to Theorem 1, the application of the weak axiom only gives the standard "average correlation" result between goods and factor prices: on-averagehigher good prices yield on-average-higher factor prices. On the other hand, the application of the weak axiom does not require assumptions on v, it is purely a product of cost minimization.
When n = 2, Samuelson [13] also proved the Factor-Price Equalization Theorem: if v satisfies the relative factor-intensity condition, v(s) has a global inverse, so factor prices are uniquely determined by p. In the context of trade, this implies that all countries that share the same technology must have the same factor prices. This is, arguably, an empirically less relevant proposition than the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, or than Theorem 1. When n > 2, the relative factorintensity condition is not sufficient for the existence of a global inverse. Gale and Nikaido [6] proved that, if v is C 1 , and the Jacobian of v is everywhere a P -matrix-all the principal minors of v are positive-then v is globally invertible. But even if the Jacobian is everywhere a P -matrix, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem need not hold (Chipman [2] ). Theorem 1 shows that our generalization of the factor-intensity condition suffices to give the Stolper-Samuelson result with n > 2. We do not need to address the problem of the existence of a global inverse.
English auction
We study the irrevocable exit English auction introduced by Milgrom and Weber [12] . In this game the auctioneer continuously raises the asking price, starting from zero. A bidder has the option of quitting the auction publicly at any time. Once a bidder quits, the bidder cannot reenter. The last bidder to remain active is the winner and pays the price called at the time that the previous to the last bidder leaves the auction.
We prove that the English auction has an efficient ex post equilibrium in models where bidders may have interdependent valuations and need not be ex ante identical. 5 The comparison with Jones and Scheinkman's [8] "every factor has some natural enemy" result is similar. Jones and Mitra's [7] version of Stolper-Samuelson involves a dominant diagonal condition, which shares the spirit of the dominant-effect property. But they also require additional strong assumptions: that the profile of factor shares take an identical (up to a permutation) geometric decay form for all sectors.
A sufficient condition
−i in [0, b] n−1 , s i > s i implies v i (s i , s −i ) > v i (s i , s −i ). For any s, let W (s) = i ∈ N : v i (s) v k (s) ∀k ∈ N .
We refer to W (s) as the set of "winners" at s and denote by |W (s)| the cardinality of W (s).
We now define two properties that are jointly sufficient for the existence of an efficient equilibrium. 
The interpretation of the above property is as follows. Suppose s is a profile of signals for which at least two players have equal and highest valuations. Then, the property requires that if one of the winner's signal increases to s i , then the effect of the other player's signals, when they increase from s −i to s −i , does not hurt player i. Example 5.6 of Maskin [11] (taken from Esö and Maskin [4] ) shows that even if some sort of single crossing property is satisfied, one still needs that player j 's signal does not affect player i's valuation "very" negatively, if an efficient equilibrium is to exist (an equilibrium is efficient if it always allocates the object to one of the players with the highest valuation). Valuations in Maskin's example are not increasing at ties, and that is why he finds that no efficient equilibrium exists. Stronger versions of this property have been standard in the literature. The most common assumption of this kind is that v i is increasing in s i and weakly increasing in s −i . The only paper in this literature that has an assumption that is not stronger than increasing at ties is in Krishna [9] . The assumption in that paper is neither weaker nor stronger than increasing at ties: it states that when i's signal increases, the sum of all player's valuations increases. 
It states that the effect of an increase in some signals is larger for one of the players whose signal increased than for all the rest of the players. Notice that it is a form of single crossing: if there are only two players, j 's valuation is equal to k's and j 's signal increases, j 's valuation is larger than k's. As will be shown later, it is the weakest form of "single crossing" that has been used in this branch of the literature.
In the auction we study, a strategy for a player is a function that determines a price at which to quit, for each realization of the private information, and each history of who left the auction at what price. Formally, a strategy for bidder i is a collection of functions, one for each set of (active) players A and each profile p N \A of prices at which bidders in N \A quit the auction, 
Necessity
Theorem 3 shows that the own-effect property is sufficient for the existence of equilibrium. We now prove that, under a regularity condition on valuations, there is a sense in which the own-effect property is also necessary for the existence of efficient equilibria in undominated strategies.
So far we have said that an equilibrium is efficient if it allocates the object to one of the players with the highest valuation for all profiles of signals. This definition of efficiency is the most demanding if one is concerned with finding sufficient conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium. But one could also use another definition of efficiency which is more demanding for necessity, and less so for sufficiency. Let us say that if an equilibrium of the English auction (with valuations v and distribution of signals μ) assigns the object to the highest bidder with μ-probability 1 it is μ-efficient.
Suppose now that we want to prove a theorem like "If property P of the profile of valuations v is violated, then there is no μ-efficient equilibrium for any μ." There is no hope for such a theorem, because if we assume v i (0) = 0 for all i and set μ(0) = 1, then any strategy profile that has β N i (0, ∅) = 0 (all players quit at p = 0, when all players are active, if they have a signal of 0) is a μ-efficient equilibrium. Hence, we will show a theorem of the form "If property P of the profile of valuations v is violated, then there is a μ such that no μ-efficient equilibrium exists." 
is invertible.
We now show that in the presence of the regularity assumption above, the own effect property is necessary. 6 We also assume that if two or more players quit at the same price, the tie is broken assigning the object to each player with positive probability. 7 
Theorem 4 (Necessity of the own effect property). Let the functions

Related literature
In this section we show that the two properties used by Krishna [9] (Average and Cyclical Crossing Conditions) imply the own-effect property. We also show that under the structure used by Birulin and Izmalkov [1] their "generalized single crossing property" is equivalent to the OEP.
For any P ⊂ N , let I P denote the vector in R n with 1 in the j th coordinate iff j ∈ P and 0 otherwise and let ∇v k denote the gradient of v k . 
Theorem 5. If v satisfies the Average Crossing, or the Cyclical Crossing, condition, then it satisfies the OEP.
As an illustration of the importance of the OEP assumption for auctions, we now show that when there are two players, it is weaker than the Single Crossing Condition: Suppose there are two players; the functions v = (v 1 , v 2 ) satisfy the Single Crossing Condition if at any s such that
This is the version in Dasgupta and Maskin [3] . In Maskin [10] the inequality is weak, but applies to all s. Since single crossing is necessary for the existence of efficient equilibria in twoplayer auctions, the OEP is also necessary. 
which contradicts the SC condition, and therefore proves that if SC holds, so does the OEP.
We will now show that if the Maskin Single Crossing holds, so does the OEP. As before, assume ε * < 1, so that
and define s = ε * s We now turn to Birulin and Izmalkov [1] . We show that our Theorem 3 implies their main result. The main assumptions in Birulin and Izmalkov are: regularity (introduced in Eq. (6)), that ∇v j (s) 0 for all j and s (which implies increasing at ties), and the following property: 
Final remarks
We have used similar "relative sensitivity" assumptions on a system of equations to obtain results in two seemingly different applications. Intuitively we require that a variable be associated to each function so that the own effect is stronger than the cross effect. There are alternative formalizations of this intuition. We used three different ones in the paper, the dominant-effect, the adapted dominant-effect, and the own effect property. The adapted dominant-effect is simply a version of the dominant-effect adapted to non-scalar variables, for the non-square StolperSamuelson theorem.
The own effect property is weaker than the dominant-effect property. In trying to establish the efficiency of the English auction we looked for the weakest condition that would yield the result. Indeed, we also show that the own-effect property is necessary if one is willing to assume a regularity condition.
Both properties, however, have much in common. Suppose there are three functions with three variables and that each variable s i has a stronger influence on v i than the other variables do. Both properties rule out the possibility that if s 1 and s 2 increase, the change in v 3 might dominate the changes in v 1 and v 2 .
Appendix A. Proof of results on English auctions
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the construction of an equilibrium with certain properties. This kind of equilibrium was previously used in Milgrom and Weber [12] , Maskin [10] , Krishna [9] and Birulin and Izmalkov [1] . It is based on the following simple idea. Since exits in English auctions are public, one player's quitting conveys information to the other players about the quitter's signal. Suppose there is an increasing function σ (p) mapping prices into profiles of signals such that v i (σ (p)) = v j (σ (p)) = p for all i and j . Suppose that no player has quit, and the price is p. Then, in the proposed equilibrium player i stays in the auction as long as s i > σ i (p) and quits when s i = σ i (p). Therefore, when a player quits, his signal s i = σ i (p) becomes known. This is a reasonable strategy since, as long as nobody quits, players know that s σ (p) and therefore v i (s) p for all i. In any sub-auction in which the set of active players is B, let us call y N \B the vector of known signals of the players who have already quit. The informal description of the strategies that will be used in the efficient ex-post equilibrium are the following: 
Defining a non-empty set X. For any
Notice that by condition (a) P = {p: p = v i (y) for some i ∈ A} is a singleton and the function σ
Defining a partial order on X. Define a partial order on X by (P , σ ) (P , σ ) if and only if
Showing that every chain in X has an upper bound. Take any totally ordered set (a chain) {(P α , σ α )} α in X and define P ≡ α P α and σ :
for any α such that p ∈ P α . Notice that the definition of σ does not depend on the specific α chosen, since if p belongs to two different P α and P α , we still get σ α (p) = σ α (p). I will first show that (P , σ ) ∈ X, and then that (P , σ ) is an upper bound for {(P α , σ α )} α .
It is easy to check that σ is weakly increasing. Also, for any p ∈ P , there is some α for which: p ∈ P α and σ α (p) = σ (p). Then, since (P α , σ α ) ∈ X, we get
To see that (P , σ ) is an upper bound, note that for any α we have P ⊇ P α and σ (p) = σ α (p) for all p ∈ P α .
Showing that the maximal element implied by Zorn's lemma must have P = π . Zorn's lemma then ensures that there exists a maximal element (P M , σ M ) in X. We now show that P M = π . Suppose p / ∈ P M , notice that we have v i (y) ∈ P M and v i (y) is a lower bound for P M , so { p ∈ P M : p < p } is non-empty, so define p * = sup p { p ∈ P M : p < p }. If there is some p ∈ P M such that p > p let
Case A, p * * * / ∈ P M . Consider first the case in which p * / ∈ P M . We set P = P M ∪ {p * } and letting {p n } be an increasing sequence in P M that converges to p * , define σ on P through
Since σ M is increasing, the limit is well defined. Moreover, it is easy to check that σ is increasing. For all p ∈ P M , we already know that V
for p * , we also have that, by continuity of V
Case B, p * * * ∈ P M and ∃p ∈ P M such that p > p . Consider now the case in which p * ∈ P M , so that p * < p . If there is some p ∈ P M such that p > p , one can follow the same steps as in Case A to discard the case in which p * / ∈ P M , so assume that p * ∈ P M . Let s = σ M (p * ), and s = σ M (p * ) and fix any p with
Assume, without loss of generality, that s i > s i for all i (when they are equal, the signal of player i just becomes a fixed "parameter" in the V functions, and thus plays no role). Let g : R → (−1, 1) be any strictly decreasing function with 
which is a contradiction. That is, we had chosen a small p, so that a large increase in the signal (s f ) = p for all i, so that P = P M ∪ {p} and
Case C, p * * * ∈ P M and p ∈ P M such that p > p . Recall s = σ (p * ) and fix any p with
Let g : R → (−1, 1) be any strictly decreasing function with
The function h has a fixed point s f , so we will show that for all i, V 
Items (1) and (2) have established for all i, so that P = P M ∪ {p} and
So far we have established that for all p in [V
, and σ y N\A is increasing. Since y and A are fixed throughout the proof, we will let σ (p) stand for σ y N\A (p) and V i for V 
We can now repeat exactly the same steps as we have done so far (with s 1 in place of y A ) and show that in the
, and notice again that if σ i (p 2 ) = b for some i, the proof is complete by letting p A y = p 2 . Continuing in this fashion, we get an increasing sequence of s t and p t with the properties that for all i,
In the limit p ∞ , s ∞ we obtain for all i
Since V i is increasing in s i this means that s ∞ i = b, so that we can set p A y = p ∞ . This completes the proof of (i) and (ii). To establish (iii) set s = (σ y N\A (p), y N \A ) and s = y. If s = s conditions (a) and (b) yield the desired result, so assume s = s. Note that:
∈ A as was to be shown. 2
The previous lemma establishes the existence of a σ function that maps prices into signals, the resulting profile of signals being the "presumption" that other players will have about a players' signal, if he quits at a certain price. The set A is the set of "active" players at a certain moment, and the profile of signals y is decomposed in the set of signals of inactive players y N \A and the set of signals such that all active players have signals greater than y A . Lemma A.1 describes the presumption of other players about a certain player's signal, when he should have quit, but he did not (in the sense that his presumed signal is b, but he did not quit). The difference with the previous lemma is that we allow some elements of y B to be equal to b (whereas in Lemma A. 
Then, it is easy to check that σ y N\B defined by 
which contradicts (A.6), and therefore completes the proof. 2
The next lemma gives the connection between one set of functions σ B and the set of functions σ A when A = B\{l} for some l ∈ B. This gives the relation between the bidding strategies in a sub-auction with active players B, and the one that follows after player l has dropped out. If various players drop out at the same price, one only needs to apply the lemma repeatedly at the price of the drops ( p in the lemma). 
Since for all n and for all i, V i (σ (p n )) = p n we obtain by continuity of V i ,
. This, in turn, means that since V i is strictly increasing in s i and increasing at ties (at s ∞ all are tied), We will then show that it is also efficient.
The first part of the proof (ex-post equilibrium) follows Krishna [9] Lemma 1 closely, but does not use the fact that σ is unique or strictly increasing. Consider bidder 1 and suppose that all bidders i > 1 are following the strategy β i . We show that player 1 does not have a profitable deviation.
Consider first the case in which following β 1 player 1 wins when active players are A and signals are s: this can only happen if players in A\{1} drop at the same price, say p * . We will show that he earns a profit, no deviations are profitable: quitting before earns him 0, and he can never change the price he pays. Without loss of generality, let A = {2, 3, . . . , a}. Since all strategies β are increasing, all bidders in A can infer the signals s N \A of inactive bidders from the prices at which they dropped. Also, since player i = 2, . . . , a drop at p * and
which means that player 1 makes a profit, as was to be shown. Consider the case in which β 1 calls for bidder 1 to drop at some price p * 1 in some sub-auction with active bidders A = {1, 2, . . . , a}, when the other players quit at signals s N \A , and suppose that bidder 1 evaluates staying longer until he wins the object. Suppose he stays until winning and that bidders quit in the order a, a − 1, a − 2, . . . , 2 at prices p a · · · p 2 , so that 1 wins at a price p 2 . We will show that by doing this he cannot make a profit.
For p 2 , the price at which player 2 quits, We have already shown that it is not profitable to quit when β 1 calls for staying, and it is not profitable to stay when β 1 calls for quitting. We will now show that if in some off equilibrium path, player 1 is still active at price p when he should have quit at price p * 1 < p, then quitting is a best response (in particular, it is better than winning at p). Let the set of active bidders at p be J = {1, . . . , j}. Then, as in Eq. (A.9),
. This means quitting, as his strategy prescribes, is optimal. This completes the proof that the profile of strategies defined by σ is an ex-post equilibrium. 2 Proof of Theorem 3. Efficiency. Without loss of generality, suppose that at a profile of signals s the winner is player 1 and that the last to quit is player 2 at price p 2 . Then, we have that
The OEP then tells us that for
we must have
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 5, we prove Lemma 8, which in turn uses this simple result. Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the size of P . We already know that the result is true for P = N , so assume it is true for all P with |P | = m + 1. In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that for some P with |P | = m, j ∈ P , and some s with |W (s)| > 1 and i = j we had P We present a simple lemma that will help us show that both the Average Crossing Condition and the Cyclical Crossing Condition imply the OEP. The key to showing that these conditions imply the OEP is making the connection between the effect of one signal on all valuations (as stated in the ACC and CCC) and the effect of several signals on the valuations of two players.
Lemma 8. If v satisfies the ACC or the CCC then it satisfies the Equal Increments Condition.
Lemma 8 asserts that when one increases the signals of a set of winners (by the same small amount) then the total growth of the valuation of one of the players whose signal increased is larger than the growth of any of those whose signals did not increase.
Proof. We first show that ACC implies the Equal Increments Condition. For all h ∈ P , and i / ∈ P , by Lemma A. 5 This implies that for some j ∈ P , I P ∇v j > I P ∇v i as was to be shown. Now assume that v satisfies the CCC, and pick any s with |W (s)| > 1 and any i / ∈ P . We must show that there exists j ∈ P such that I P ∇v j > I P ∇v i . Suppose first that there is some k ∈ P with k < i and let j be the largest k in P which is still smaller than i. In order to show that I P ∇v j > I P ∇v i , it will suffice to show that for all k ∈ P \{j }, ∂v j /∂s k ∂v i /∂s k , since then ∂v j /∂s j > ∂v i /∂s j will make the desired inequality strict. Notice that for all k < i, we have k < j < i, so by the CCC, we have ∂v j Note that if for any α s 1 − s 1 we had that for some i / ∈ P , and ∀j ∈ P , v j (s + I P α) < v i (s+I P α), there would be some α * ∈ [0, α) such that for some j ∈ P and i / ∈ P : v j (s+I P α * ) = v i (s + I P α * ) and for all ε > 0, v k (s + I P [α * + ε]) < v i (s + I P [α * + ε]) for all k ∈ P . Taking derivatives with respect to ε and evaluating at ε = 0, we obtain that for s = s + I P α * we have |W (s )| > 1, and that I P ∇v k (s + I P α * ) I P ∇v i (s + I P α * ) for all k ∈ P , which contradicts the Equal Increments Condition, and would thus by Lemma 8 conclude the proof. Assume then α 1 > s 1 − s 1 .
Define then P 2 = P \{1}, and α 2 = max α: ∃j ∈ P 2 , v j s 1 , s −1 + I P 2 α v i s 1 , s −1 + I P 2 α ∀i / ∈ P 2 .
Since for all α s 1 − s 1 , ∃j ∈ P , such that v j (s + I P α) v i (s + I P α) ∀i / ∈ P , we have that α = s 1 − s 1 belongs to the set over which the max is taken, so α 2 is well defined. If we had α 2 s 2 − s 2 , we would obtain that there are j ∈ P 2 and i / ∈ P 2 such that v j ((s 1 , s −1 ) + I P 2 α 2 ) = v i ((s 1 , s −1 ) + I P 2 α 2 ) and that for all ε > 0, v k ((s 1 , s −1 ) + I P 2 [α 2 + ε]) < v i ((s 1 , s −1 ) + I P 2 [α 2 + ε]) for all k ∈ P 2 . Taking derivatives with respect to ε and evaluating at ε = 0, we obtain that for s = (s 1 , s −1 ) + I P 2 α 2 we have |W (s )| > 1, and that for all k ∈ P 2 I P 2 ∇v k (s ) I P 2 ∇v i (s ) which contradicts the Equal Increments Condition, and would thus by Lemma 8 conclude the proof.
Fix some l m and define s = (s 1 , . . . , s l−1 , s l , s l+1 , . . . , s n ) and P l = P \{1, . . . , l − 1}. As an induction hypothesis, suppose that for some j ∈ P l , v j ( s) v i ( s) for all i / ∈ P l (we have already proved this for l = 1 and l = 2) and define α l = max α: ∃j ∈ P l , v j ( s + I P l α) v i ( s + I P l α) ∀i / ∈ P l .
Again, if we had α l s l − s l we would obtain that there are j ∈ P l and i / ∈ P l such that v j ( s + I P l α l ) = v i ( s+I P l α l ) and that for all ε > 0, v k ( s+I P l [α l +ε]) < v i ( s+I P l [α l +ε]) for all k ∈ P l . Taking derivatives with respect to ε and evaluating at ε = 0, we obtain that for s = s + I P l α l we have |W (s )| > 1, and that I P l ∇v k (s ) I P l ∇v i (s ) for all k ∈ P l . This contradiction concludes the proof. 
